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We propose a formal concept of the power of voice in the context of a simple model where 
individuals form groups and trade in competitive markets. Individuals use outside options in 
two different ways. Actual outside options reflect the possibility to exit or to join other 
existing groups. Hypothetical outside options refer to hypothetical groups that are ultimately 
not formed. Articulation of hypothetical outside options in the bargaining process determines 
the relative bargaining power of the members of a group, which constitutes an instance of the 
power of voice. The adopted equilibrium concept endogenizes the outside options as well as 
the power of voice. In our illustrative example, there exists an equilibrium that uniquely 
determines the power of voice and the allocation of commodities. 
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Power has always been a prominent theme in the social sciences. The meaning of
power can include everything from the ability to keep oneself alive to the ability of
government to arrest people. A central conception of power is an individual’s capacity
to inﬂuence decisions taken by a group he or she belongs to.
The inﬂuential work of Hirschman (1970) has provided a convenient way of thinking
about the power pertaining to collective decisions of social organizations. He distin-
guishes between power derived from the exit option and power based on voice. Al-
though these concepts have been applied widely, the role of voice has proven extremely
diﬃcult to conceptualize. In particular, it is diﬃcult to explain why voice — which
may be merely cheap talk — would have any impact on material collective decisions.
In this paper we propose a concept of voice power.1 The essential idea is as follows.
In a society individuals use outside options in two diﬀerent ways. First, the possibility
to exit or to join other existing groups determines the actual outside options. Second,
individuals also reason with reference to hypothetical groups, whose formation would
require that more than one individual break away from their existing groups and form
a new group. The possibility to form hypothetical, new groups is articulated in the
bargaining process. The best possible hypothetical scenario for each person determines
the relative bargaining power in existing groups. This impact of articulating one’s
conceivable opportunities in hypothetical groups is called the “power of voice”. We
show in a simple model with four individuals that there exists an equilibrium that
uniquely determines the allocation of commodities and the power of voice.
Our paper is closely related to the theory of multilateral bargaining problems,
when there are potential gains from forming coalitions but there is conﬂict over which
coalition to form and how to distribute gains. The idea of antagonistic outside options
1Hirschman considers voice as a mechanism of recuperation and a means of inﬂuence. Here we
focus on the second function.
2appears already in Rochford (1984) who focuses on selections from the core. Bennett
(1988, 1997) has pursued the idea further and has developed an intriguing approach to
multilateral bargaining problems.2 She considers an agreement within a coalition as a
solution for the intra-coalitional bargaining process, if the agreement is consistent with
the bargaining processes in all other coalitions. The outside option of an individual
is the utility the individual would obtain from the agreement in his best alternative
coalition.3
Our model shares the one important feature with Bennett (1997) that certain (hy-
pothetical) outside options may not be disagreement outcomes because they are not
jointly compatible. Our approach diﬀers in other important aspects from the theory of
Bennett (1988, 1997). In contrast to her, we consider outside options in a dual role for
the bargaining process in a particular coalition. Coalitions belonging to the outcome
and, thus, coalitions that will actually form determine outside options in the narrow
sense. Hypothetical coalitions, that is those that ultimately are not formed, play a dif-
ferent role. They are used in the speeches of members in a particular coalition in order
to articulate potential alternatives. Then the best hypothetical outside alternatives (or
maximal complaints) determine the relative bargaining power inside the coalition.
Moreover, the research on group or coalition formation has highlighted that it is
ultimately unclear how deviations from a proposed group structure should be modelled.
Standard solutions such as Nash stability, individual or coalitional stability ignore
any possible further deviations and thus may be myopic and may lack credibility.4
Deviations can be followed by further deviations and thus it is plausible to allow a
deviating coalition to reason about the ultimate result of its deviation. Such a reasoning
2Other analyses of multilateral bargaining problems have been proposed by Kalai and Samet (1985),
Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Bennett and van Damme (1991). Bell (1991) provides a subtle discussion
of the role of power and outside options in rural societies.
3The underlying non-cooperative model is an adaptation of the proposal-making model of Selten
(1981).
4Moreover, in hedonic coalition formation games, the core may be empty. Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002), Banerjeee et al. (2001), Alcalde and Revilla (2001) and P´ apai (2000) provide conditions for
the non-emptiness of the core.
3of credibility and foresight has been initiated by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
(1944) stable set and Harsanyi’s (1974) indirect dominance. More recent formalizations
of farsightedness and solution concepts include Greenberg (1990), Chwe (1994), Xue
(1998), Diamantoudi and Xue (2003), and Barber` a and Gerber (2003). They show
that the answers depend on the behavioral characteristics of the individuals and that
there are various plausible ways to formulate how deviations might induce further
deviations. Given these diﬃculties we assume in the present paper that decision-makers
use hypothetical outside options as arguments when they bargain over consumption
bundles. The way in which such uncertain outside options impact the bargaining
outcome is axiomatized through the “voice impact function” introduced in section 4.
At a more abstract level, our paper suggests a way to formalize how discussion
among individuals can bring about a consensus. The role of communication in reaching
a consensus in democratic societies has been stressed a great deal in political science
(see e.g. Elster 1998) and philosophy (see e.g. Habermas 1987). In our context,
discussion enables each side to convince the other of the feasibility of potential best
alternatives. Each individual assesses the feasibility of hypothetical outside options of
other group members. We assume that this deliberation and discussion transforms the
best hypothetical outside alternative of one individual into concessions by the other
individual and thus into relative bargaining power.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce a simple model
that serves as an illustrative example. In section 4 we derive the equilibria with free
group formation. Voice is introduced and the equilibria with voice are derived in section
5. In section 6 we illustrate our ﬁndings with a numerical example. Section 7 oﬀers
ﬁnal remarks.
42 Basic Feedback Mechanism
Here we outline the basic feedback mechanism that incorporates the impact of voice.
We envision an economy where individuals can form two-person groups that trade in
competitive markets. Individuals are denoted by i or j. It is assumed that at the
prevailing market conditions, person j obtains utility U0
j from acting and living as a
single. The utility levels U0
j are called actual outside options. If individuals 1 and 2
form group h, they enjoy respective bargaining power βh and 1 − βh, say, within the
group. Maximization of the Nash product
Nh = (U1 − U
0
1)




with respect to feasible utilities (U1,U2) ≥ (U0
1,U0
2) yields a solution (U∗
1,U∗
2). We
shall continue to focus on the group h = {1,2}, while an analogous treatment applies
to any two-person group that actually forms.
The values U0
j , j 6= 1,2, also serve as reservation utility levels when individuals
1 or 2 form a hypothetical group with other individuals. These reservation utilities
determine hypothetical outside option values b U1 and b U2, embodying the best conceiv-
able outcomes that person 1 and 2, respectively, could expect when forming groups
with third parties. Assuming b Ui > U∗
i , the diﬀerence b Ui − U∗
i constitutes the maximal
complaint i = 1,2 can articulate vis-` a-vis her partner. The power of voice manifests
itself via the impact of b U1 −U∗
1 and b U2 −U∗
2 on the bargaining weight βh. Namely, we
postulate a voice impact function f : I R+ → I R+ so that5
βh = f
Ã b U1 − U∗
1




which is tantamount to equation (3) below. Thus given actual outside option values
U0
1,U0
2,... and actual two-person groups g,h,..., one obtains a composite mapping B
from the tuples of bargaining weights (βg,βh,...) to the tuples of bargaining weights.
B has the following schematic form:
5The deﬁnition can be extended to the cases b Ui < U∗
i by setting βh = 1 if b U1 > U∗
1 and b U2 < U∗
2
and βh = 1
2 if b Ui < U∗












A ﬁxed point of B endogenizes the power of voice.
We envision such a scheme to apply to many socio-economic situations. In the
illustrative example below, the maximizer of Nh will assume the parametric form
U∗
1 = U1(αh),U∗
2 = U2(αh) where αh is the weight of individual 1 in the utalitar-
ian welfare function of household h and the ﬁxed point problem will be formulated in
terms of the parameter-tuples (αg,αh,...); see equation (5). Moreover, the economic
environment is going to depend on the price system p which in turn is determined by
market clearing conditions.
3 The Model: An Illustrative Example
In this section, we describe the primitive data of our example. The model is an ex-
change economy where individuals can form groups in which they beneﬁt from group
externalities. Hence, we need to deﬁne consumers, group structures, commodities,
endowments, allocations, and preferences.
3.1 Consumer Characteristics and Allocations
We consider a population of four consumers, represented by the set I = {1,...,4}. A
generic consumer is again denoted by i or j. A population with four individuals proves
to be just enough to deﬁne and illustrate the concept of power of voice.
The population I is partitioned into groups, i.e. there exists a partition P of I into
non-empty subsets. We call any such partition P a group structure in I. A generic
group is denoted h, g or k. We treat the group structure as an object of endogenous
choice. Groups are endogenously formed so that some group structure P is ultimately
realized.
6We assume that there exist two commodities for private consumption. Each in-
dividual i ∈ I has a consumption set Xi = I R
2
+ so that the commodity allocation
space is X ≡
Q
j∈I Xj. The consumption of individual i is denoted by xi = (x1
i,x2
i)
or yi = (y1
i,y2
i). The consumption allocation is denoted by x. Xh =
Q
i∈h Xi is the
consumption set for group h. Xh has generic elements xh = (xi)i∈h.
Preferences are represented by Ui(xh;h) = Ui(xi) + UG





i denotes the quantity of good k (k = 1,2) consumed by individual i. UG
i (h)
captures the pure group externality contributing to the utility of individual i. Speciﬁ-
cally, we assume γ ∈ (0,1), b > 0 and
Ui(xh;h) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
γ lnx1
i + (1 − γ) lnx2
i, in case h = {i};
γ lnx1
i + (1 − γ) lnx2
i + vij, in case h = {i,j} with vij ≥ 0, i 6= j;
γ lnx1
i + (1 − γ) lnx2
i − b, in case #h = 3;
γ lnx1
i + (1 − γ) lnx2
i − b, in case #h = 4.
Note that we adopt the assumption in Gersbach and Haller (2003) that an individual
does not care about the features of an allocation beyond the boundaries of his own
group. If a particular group structure is given, he is indiﬀerent about the aﬃliation and
consumption of individuals not belonging to his own group. Note that forming a three-
person or four-person group exerts negative group externalities of −G on everybody.
Hence, such groups will never be formed in equilibrium.
We further assume individual endowments wi = (w1
i,w2
i). For a potential group h,
its endowment is the commodity bundle wh ∈ I R
2 given by the sum of the endowments
of all participating individuals: wh =
P
i∈h wi. The social or aggregate endowment is
wS =
P
i∈I wi. An allocation is a pair (x;P) specifying the consumption bundle and
group membership of each consumer.
73.2 The Equilibrium Notion
The notion of voice power will act as a selection device for competitive exchange among
groups. Hence, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne an equilibrium notion in which the power of voice
can be embedded. Among the several conceivable ways to formulate an equilibrium
state of a model with variable group structure, we follow Gersbach and Haller (2003)
and employ the concept of a competitive equilibrium with free group formation.
We brieﬂy review the deﬁnition for a competitive equilibrium with free group for-
mation. We consider a group h ∈ P and a price system p ∈ I R
2. For xh = (xi)i∈h ∈ Xh,








denotes the expenditure of group h on group consumption plan xh at the price system
p. As p and xh are of diﬀerent dimension for multi-member groups, we use the ∗-
product in lieu of the familiar inner product. Then group h’s budget set is deﬁned
as
Bh(p) = {xh ∈ Xh : p ∗ xh ≤ p · wh}.
We next deﬁne the eﬃcient budget set EBh(p) as the set of xh ∈ Bh(p) with the
property that there is no yh ∈ Bh(p) such that
(i) Ui(yh;h) ≥ Ui(xh;h) for all i ∈ h;
(ii) Ui(yh;h) > Ui(xh;h) for some i ∈ h.
Further deﬁne a state of the economy as a triple (p,x;P) such that p ∈ I R
2 is a
price system and (x;P) ∈ X × P is an allocation, i.e. x = (xi)i∈I is an allocation of
commodities and P is an allocation of consumers (a group structure, a partition of the
population into groups). A state (p,x;P) is a competitive equilibrium with free
group formation (CEFG) if it satisﬁes the following conditions:
81. xh ∈ EBh(p) for all h ∈ P.
2.
P
i xi = wS.
3. There is no h ∈ P, i ∈ h and yi ∈ B{i}(p) such that
Ui(yi;{i}) > Ui(xh;h).
4. There are no h and g ∈ P, i ∈ h and yg∪{i} ∈ Bg∪{i}(p) such that
Uj(yg∪{i};g ∪ {i}) > Uj(xg;g) for all j ∈ g;
Ui(yg∪{i};g ∪ {i}) > Ui(xh;h).
Condition 1 reﬂects collective rationality. Eﬃcient choice by the group refers to
the individual consumption and welfare of its members, not merely to the aggregate
consumption bundle of the group. Condition 2 requires market clearing. Condition 3
stipulates that no individual wants to leave a group and participate as a one-member
group in the market at the going equilibrium prices. Condition 4 requires that no
individual can leave a group and can propose a feasible consumption allocation to the
members of a new group, created by the individual and another already existing group,
which makes everybody in the new group better oﬀ at the going equilibrium prices.
4 Equilibria with Free Group Formation
To prepare a formal treatment of the power of voice, we ﬁrst characterize equilibria with
free group formation (CEFG). We observe that we can neglect group structures where
the group size is larger than 2, since forming a four-person or a three-person group
exerts negative group externalities on everybody. Accordingly, only group structures
with two two-person groups prevail in CEFG.
Commodity prices are normalized so that p1 = 1. We can represent the eﬃcient
decisions of a two-person group h = {i,j},i < j, by assuming that the group maximizes
9a utilitarian social welfare function
Wh = αhUi(xi) + (1 − αh)Uj(xj)
subject to the budget constraint. The number αh (0 ≤ αh ≤ 1) is the utalitarian weight
of individual i in household h. In this section we treat αh as parametrically given.
In section 5 the weight αh will be endogenized. Given any p2, identical homothetic
preferences with respect to consumption imply that group demand as well as individual
consumption bundles will be linear in income. Hence, we immediately obtain
Lemma 1 CEFG exist and have the following properties:
(i) Two two-person groups are formed.
(ii) The equilibrium price p∗
2 is given by p∗
2 = (1 − γ) · w1
S/[γ · w2
S],









k for any group k.
(iii) The equilibrium allocation for a group structure P, say P = {h,g} with h =
{1,2} and g = {3,4}, is characterized by two numbers αh and αg (0 < αh < 1,












4 = (1 − αg)(y∗
g/y∗
S)wS.
To establish the boundaries for the numbers αh and αg we observe that we can
neglect the joining option. Forming three-person groups does not create positive group
externalities for the entrant and destroys existing beneﬁts of group formation. Hence,
exit dominates joining in all conceivable deviations from the CEFG candidate.




























For a typical group structure that can qualify for a CEFG, say P = {h,g} with h =
{1,2} and g = {3,4}, there exist αh < αh and αg < αg such that a CEFG with the
properties described in lemma 1 exists if and only if
αh ≤ αh ≤ αh and αg ≤ αg ≤ αg.
5 Voice Power
5.1 The Concept
The remaining question is how αh and αg are determined. For that purpose we intro-
duce voice in the following sense: Every group member expresses the utility that he
could achieve in a hypothetical group, i.e. in a group that does not currently exist and
cannot be formed by exit or by joining another group. The potential gains relative to
current utility that group members can identify in their speeches will then determine
relative bargaining power through the power of voice.
To formulate the notion of voice power we start with the bargaining problem in a


















To determine the values of βh and αh we proceed in two steps. In the ﬁrst step,
we determine the weight αh that maximizes the Nash product for a given value of βh.
In the second step we determine the value of βh for a given αh through the power of
voice. An equilibrium will be a pair (α∗
h,β∗
h) that solves the group bargaining problem
and is consistent with voice power.
We start with the ﬁrst step. To simplify the notation we use the following shortcuts.
If αh is the weight of the ﬁrst member in the actual group h in the utilitarian welfare
11function, we can express the various utilities as follows:
U1(αh) := U1(xh;h) = γ ln{αhγy
∗
h} + (1 − γ)ln{αh(1 − γ)y
∗
h} + v12
U2(αh) := U2(xh;h) = γ ln{(1 − αh)γy
∗







2)) = γ ln{γy
∗







2)) = γ ln{γy
∗
2} + (1 − γ)ln{(1 − γ)y
∗
2}
For any given βh, the bargaining problem is well deﬁned and can be solved for





































In the second step we determine βh as a function of the utilitarian weight αh through
the power of voice. First, we need to be precise about the thinking of members in
actual groups about allocations in hypothetical groups. We assume that individuals
articulate situations in hypothetical groups to which they might belong and in which
other members do not want to leave. We assume that vi3 > vi4,i = 1,2 and v3i >
v4i,i = 1,2. An individual i = 1,2 can imagine being in a two-person group {i,3} or
{i,4}. We concentrate on the group k = {i,3} since forming a group with individual 3
is the more attractive hypothetical group. If individual i imagines a group allocation
such that individual 3 obtains his utility as a single, the maximal hypothetical utility
for individual i, denoted by b Ui, is determined by the system of equations


















































+ (1 − γ) ln
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Note that αk is the highest possible weight individual i can have in household
k without forcing the exit of individual 3. It is obvious that αk and b Ui are uniquely
determined. Running through the same exercise for group g = {3,4}, when individuals
imagine forming groups with the ﬁrst individual, yields imagined utilities b Ui, i = 3,4.
We assume that the utilities b Ui are used in the speeches of existing groups to express
their members’ aspirations and we further assume that these aspirations translate into
relative bargaining power in existing groups. Hence, the relative bargaining power
must be consistent with the potential utility gains that individuals can articulate for
hypothetical groups. For that purpose we introduce the voice impact function
f : I R+ → I R+ which can be applied to groups h and g. We deﬁne the voice impact
function by using group h. The diﬀerence b Ui−Ui(αh) compares individual i’s maximal
aspiration with the status quo. In a sense, the diﬀerence constitutes the (maximal)
complaint i can articulate about his treatment in the status quo. We postulate that
the ﬁrst consumer’s bargaining power in group h depends on the relative complaints
via the voice impact function:
βh = f
Ã b U1 − U1(αh)
b U2 − U2(αh)
!
(3)
The voice impact function is assumed to satisfy the following requirements:
Properties of the Voice Impact Function
(1) f(0) = 0
(2) f(x) + f(1/x) = 1
(3) lim
x→∞ f (x) = 1
(4) f0 > 0
13The condition f(x) + f(1/x) = 1 supposes that both group members are equally
able in transforming hypothetical but possible utility gains from forming other groups
into bargaining power through articulation of their aspirations or complaints.
5.2 Equilibria
To satisfy all four axioms, we specify the voice impact function as f(x) = x/(x + 1).
Applying the voice impact function (3) to group h amounts to
βh =
b U1 − U1(αh)
b U1 − U1(αh) + b U2 − U2(αh)
;
1 − βh =
b U2 − U2(αh)
b U1 − U1(αh) + b U2 − U2(αh)
.
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
(4)
Assuming that there exists a pair (αh,βh) with 0 ≤ αh ≤ 1, 0 ≤ βh ≤ 1 that
satisﬁes the above equations and inserting the voice power associated with βh and
1 − βh into the group optimization rule (given by equation (2)) yields:










Suppose there exists αh ∈ [αh,αh] such that b U1 > U1(αh) and b U2 > U2(αh). Then
there exist unique values α∗
h ∈ (0,1) and β∗
h ∈ (0,1) that solve the group optimization
problem and are consistent with voice power. α∗
h is determined by (5).
The proof of proposition 1 follows immediately from the observation that the left
side of (5) is strictly decreasing in αh whereas the right side of (5) is strictly increasing
in αh. Moreover, for αh → 0 (1 − αh → 0) the left side (right side) becomes inﬁnite.
14Proposition 1 shows how exit and voice power interact in determining the group




















We note that exit and voice uniquely determine the group allocation. Given that




Suppose there exist utalitarian weights αh ∈ [αh,αh] and αg ∈ [αg,αg] such that b U1 >
U1(αh), b U2 > U2(αh), b U3 > U3(αg), and b U4 > U4(αg). Then for P = {{1,2},{3,4}},
there exists a unique CEFG of the form (p∗,x∗,P) that satisﬁes the voice power con-
sistency requirement.
Observation 1.
We chose the above voice impact function f(x) = x/(1+x) for the sake of convenience
and transparency. Observe that any voice impact function f is determined by its re-
striction to x ∈ [0,1], since f(x) = 1 − f(1/x) for x > 1. Moreover, f(1) = 1/2.
Conversely, any diﬀerentiable function f : [0,1] → I R+ with f(0) = 0,f(1) = 1/2 and
f0 > 0 can be extended to a voice impact function by setting f(x) = 1 − f(1/x) for
x > 1.
Observation 2.
Suppose all consumers have identical homothetic preferences for consumption, repre-
sented by a continuous, concave and weakly increasing utility function which is diﬀer-
entiable, strictly concave and strictly increasing on I R
`
++. Then an analogue of lemma
151 holds. Next consider household h = {1,2}, say, with voice impact function f. Then
given βh and the equilibrium price system determined in lemma 1, maximization of the
Nash product Nh yields αh as a continuous function ϕ1 of βh. On the other hand, (3)
determines βh as a continuous function ϕ2 of αh. By Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem,
the composition mapping ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2 has a ﬁxed point α∗
h. Hence there exist α∗
h ∈ [0,1]
and β∗
h ∈ [0,1] that solve the group optimization problem and are consistent with voice
power. The value of β∗
h is obtained via (3). Application of the ﬁxed point theorem
does not yield uniqueness and interiority, which falls short of proposition 2.
6 A Numerical Example
To illustrate the working of proposition 2 we use the following parameter values:
γ = 1 − γ =
1
2
, w1 = w2 = w3 = w4 = (1,1)
Accordingly, p∗





















{ln[2αk] + ln[2αk]} + v13 = ln[2αk] + v13
U3(x
0
3(1)) = 0 =
1
2
{ln(2(1 − αk)) + ln(2(1 − αk))} + v31
b U2 = ln[2αk0] + v23
U3(x
0
3(1)) = 0 =
1
2
{ln(2(1 − αk0) + ln(2(1 − αk0)} + v32
where k = {1,3} and k0 = {2,3}. This implies:
2(1 − αk) = e
−v31 , b U1 = ln(2 − e
−v31) + v13
2(1 − αk0) = e
−v32 , b U2 = ln(2 − e
−v32) + v23
16Using (5), we ﬁnd that the group allocation satisﬁes:
ln(2 − e−v31) + v13 − ln(2αh) − v12
αh(ln(2αh) + v12)
=
ln(2 − e−v32) + v23 − ln[2(1 − αh)] − v21
(1 − αh)(ln[2(1 − αh)] + v21)
This equation determines α∗
h. We obtain
Corollary 2 Suppose v12 = v21. Suppose that there exists αh such b U1 > U1(αh) > 0
















Intuitively, the higher v13 relative to v23 and the higher v31 relative to v32, the
higher the relative bargaining power of the ﬁrst individual since her power of voice is
comparatively larger.
7 Final Remarks
Via an example we have proposed and examined a concept of voice power. Numerous
issues deserve further attention. Apart from incorporating voice power in more general
models, a more detailed behavioral foundation of our concept should be taken up in fu-
ture research. Moreover, here the power of voice relies on cardinal utility speciﬁcations
since the voice impact function relies on cardinality. However, it would be desirable
to have a clear view as to which properties of voice depend on ordinal properties of
preferences and which properties depend on the cardinal representation.
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